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The Court of Appeals found the ALJ interpretation of the "last employer doctrine"
was a misreading of Port of Portland and Ramey; and the AJL erred when he merged
these claims. The court noted that although the "last employer doctrine" involves a
certain amount of arbitrariness, it does not extend to hold an employer liable for a claim
that had first been filed against a separate employer, and was simply not resolved. Thus,
had the first claim been dealt with expeditiously, the second claim would have been
considered a separate injury. H ere, the two reliable audiograms pointed to two separate
injuries sustained while under the employ of Container and SSA. Under these
circumstances it was error to treat the claims stemming from two valid audiograms as one
undifferentiated injury.
The Court of Appeals concluded that in a hearing loss case where a claimant
may continue to work despite being considered legally disabled, he may be exposed to
additional injury over time. Thus, an employer who is liable under the application of the
"last employer doctrine" should not be able to escape liability just because a second
employer can also be held liable under the same doctrine for a later, separate injury.
Therefore the Court of Appeals held that under the correct application of the "last
employer doctrine" Container is liable for 28.5 percent of the hearing loss shown in the
1991 audiogram. The appellate court reversed the Board's decision and remanded it to
the Board for consideration in light of its opinion.
Brian F. Allen

PERSONAL INJURY UNDER THE JONES ACT, LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKER'S
COMPENSATION ACT AND NEW YORK LABOR LAW
A dockbuilder is not a seaman and therefore cannot sue under the Jones Act. A
subcontractor's employee can sue a general contractor for negligence under the
LHWCA. New York Labor Law§§ 200 and 240 (6) grant an injured worker
recourse against general contractors who breach their duty to provide a safe
workplace.

O'Hara v. Weeks Marine, Inc.
294 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2002)
(Decided April 1, 2002)
Plaintiff, Gerard O'Hara ("O'Hara"), a dockbuilder's union member, suffered a
work-related injury while repairing a pier in Staten Island, New York. Two barges- a
"materials barge" and a "crane barge"- were employed for the project and moored to
bulkheads on the pier. Plaintiff was employed by Collazo Contractors, Inc. ("Collazo")
and assigned to the crane barge where the injury occurred.
Plaintiff brought suit in the United State District Court for the Eastern District of
New York against general contractor Weeks Marine, Inc. ("Weeks") and subcontractor
Collazo, claiming damages under the Jones Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act ("LHWCA").
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The district court dismissed the Jones Act claims because the barges were not
vessels in navigation and the plaintiff was not a seaman. In response to defendants'
summary judgment motions for the LHWCA claims, plaintiff argued for the first time
that Weeks was liable under New York Labor Law § § 200 and 241(6). The district court
generously constmed the reference to state law as a motion seeking to amend the
complaint, but later denied the plaintiff the right to amend. The district court granted
Weeks' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, plaintiff conceded that he did not have a cause of action against
Collazo because of the LHWCA's provisions granting no-fault compensation payments
to employees for work-related injuries and barring suits against their employers. The
Second Circuit first addressed the plaintiffs Jones Act claims. The appellate court stated
that the barges were not vessels in navigation, and that even if they were, the duration and
nature of the plaintiffs work was insufficient to establish a connection to the vessel. Over
the course of his five-month employment, the plaintiff had not occupied the barge
overnight nor had he assisted in its navigation. The appellate court also noted that the
plaintiff lacked a Coast Guard license or other seaman's papers and had failed to show
that his duties contributed to the function of the vessel. Instead, the appellate court found,
the plaintiffs tasks were limited to the pier and a mere transitory or sporadic cmmection
to the barge was insufficient to confer seaman status.
However, with regard to the plaintiffs LHWCA claims, the Second Circuit
concluded that Weeks may have breached its Scindia duties as a third-party vessel owner:
the duty to intervene and active control duty. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los
Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981). These duties require the owner of a vessel to warn of those
known hazards that are not obvious, to remedy unreasonable hazards, and to intervene if
the stevedore (in this case Collazo) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect its
employees form ham1. When a crane malfunctioned, an employee of Weeks ordered the
plaintiff to manually lift heavy equipment, causing the plaintiffs injury. The appellate
court found that whether or not this posed an unreasonable risk of harm and whether
Weeks actually or constructively knew of the hazard were factual issues that precluded
summary judgment.
The Second Circuit also noted that both parties failed to raise the borrowed
servant doctrine, which could have linked Weeks as a dual-capacity defendant. As the
issue was not raised, the court did not consider it.
Finally the appellate court reviewed the district court's denial of leave to amend
the complaint, for abuse of discretion. Although a new claim may be barred by the statute
of limitations and amendment could include the claim if it arose from conduct in the
original pleading, the Second Circuit found that the New York Labor Law claims under
§200 and §241(6) arose out of the original LHWCA claim that was erroneously
dismissed, and thus ordered the lower court to reconsider the matter.
Yee Ling Elaine Lau
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